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Conseil Scientifique du CEPANI du 25 octobre 2012 
By Caroline VERBRUGGEN,   Lawyer DLA Piper Brussels 
    Member of the Scientific Committee of CEPANI 
Le Conseil scientifique du 
CEPANI s'est réuni le 25 
octobre dernier sous la 
présidence du Vice-
Président Me Didier 
Matray, avec la 
participation des membres 
suivants: A. Fettweis, D. 
Philippe, D. Struyven, E. Van Campenhoudt, 
D. Van Gerven et C. Verbruggen. 
Le projet de programme de la journée d'étude 
à l'attention des magistrats a été présenté, 
prévoyant l'intervention d'orateurs et 
magistrats néerlandais et français.  
Cette journée d'étude aura lieu en janvier 
2013.  Le conseil a également discuté du 
programme de deux colloques futurs, l'un 
relatif à la confidentialité, et l'autre à 
l'arbitrage et au droit des assurances.  Le 
projet de l'organisation à Bruxelles d'un cours 
relatif à l'arbitrage, destiné aux praticiens et 
juristes d'entreprises, a également été 
évoqué.  Un partenariat pourrait être 
envisagé avec les universités. 
Articles
Report on the 57th session of UNCITRAL Working Group 
II (“Arbitration and Conciliation”): Preparation of a 
legal standard on transparency in treaty-based 
investor-State arbitration – Difficulty to reach 
consensus (1-5 October 2012, Vienna) 
 
By Herman VERBIST,   Lawyer at the Ghent and Brussels Bars (Everest attorneys) 
 Visiting Professor at the University of Ghent 
The 57th session of 
UNCITRAL Working Group 
II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) was held in 
Vienna from 1 to 5 October 
2012. It was CEPANI‟s 
eigth session as “observer”. 
The “members” present at 
the meeting in Vienna represented 39 
countries and among the “observers” (of which 
Belgium)  there were 18 countries 
represented.  5 intergovernmental 
organizations and 26 non-governmental 
organizations (of which CEPANI) were als 
represented.  In total, more or less 200 
persons attended this session. However, not 
everyone participated actively in the 
discussions. 
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This was the fifth session of UNCITRAL 
Working Group II committed to the 
preparation of a legal standard on 
transparency in treaty-based investor-State 
arbitration. As the previous sessions on this 
subject, it was chaired by Mr. Salim Moollan. 
At the 55th session in Vienna in October 2011 
(see H. VERBIST, “Report of the 55th session of UNCITRAL 
Working Group II in Vienna, 3-7 October 2011”, CEPANI 
Newsletter no. 60, p. 7-11), the Working Group had 
done a first reading of the draft rules on 
transparency in treaty-based investor-State 
arbitration that had been elaborated by the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat. Those draft Rules had 
been made on the basis of the discussions held 
at the Working Group‟s session of 4-8 October 
2010 in Vienna (see H. VERBIST, “Report of the 53rd 
session of UNCITRAL Working Group II in Vienna, 4-8 
October 2010”, CEPANI Newsletter no. 50, p. 4-7) and at 
the session of 7-11 February 2011 in New York 
(see H. VERBIST, “Report of the 54th session of UNCITRAL 
Working Group II in New York, 7-11 February 2011”, 
CEPANI Newsletter no. 54, p. 4-10). 
At the 56th session in New York in February 
2012 (see H. VERBIST, “Report on the 56th session of 
UNCITRAL Working Group II in New York, 6-10 February 
2012”, CEPANI Newsletter no. 63, p. 5-9), the Working 
Group had started with the second reading of 
the draft rules on transparency in treaty-based  
investor-State arbitration, more particularly 
Articles 1 and 2. At the 57th session in Vienna 
in October 2012 the second reading was 
continued with respect to Articles 3 to 9 and 
also, again, with respect to Article 1. 
(i) Difficulty to reach consensus 
The elaboration by the UNCITRAL Working 
Group of draft rules on transparency in treaty-
based investor-State arbitration is an almost 
revolutionary work which causes the 
delegations to reconsider the view they 
traditionally had on arbitration as a 
confidential dispute settlement mechanism. 
Given the public funds involved in investment 
arbitration, there is a recognised public 
interest for the decisions taken by arbitral 
tribunals in investor-State arbitrations. This 
aspect of transparency, however, may 
sometimes come into conflict with an interest 
of data protection, protection of national 
policies or other national interests such as a 
security interest. 
Moreover, given the total number of about 
3.000 bilateral investment treaties signed so 
far by the various States (UNCTAD World 
Investment Report 2012, on http://www.unctad-
docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf), the 
States are struggling with the question 
whether or not the new rules on transparency 
should be made applicable to all those existing 
treaties and, if so, how this could be done. 
UNCITRAL‟s practice of working on a basis of 
consensus has contributed in the past to giving 
a worldwide support to the rules and model 
laws it elaborated. As the policies of the 
Member States of UNCITRAL in the field of 
investment are not all identical, it turns out to 
be difficult to find a consensus as to the form 
and the content of the transparency rules 
which the working group is asked to elaborate. 
During the 56th and the 57th sessions of the 
Working Group some Member States have 
indicated that there is no consensus and that 
they therefore can not accept the texts thusfar 
discussed. 
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As the secretary of UNCITRAL has set out both 
at the 56th and 57th sessions, the concept of 
consensus used by UNCITRAL means that 
there is no vote on rules of model laws that 
are elaborated and that there have been no 
objections to such rules or model laws. The 
consensus of the Member States is understood 
so as to capture the substantially prevailing 
position of the delegations. Generally, this 
reflects the view of a wide majority and is 
therefore considered to be more than a simple 
majority. 
On a number of aspects, there was a 
consensus reached at the last 57th session, but 
on other aspects there was not  (see the Report of 
Working Group II on the Work of its fifty-seventh session, 
12 October 2012, A/CN.9/760, www.uncitral.org). On 
the aspects where no consensus was reached, 
the Secretariat is asked to formulate new 
proposals for the 58th session of the Working 
Group in February 2013 in New York. But 
there will also be proposals by some 
delegations. 
The European Union plays an important role in 
the debates, given its exclusive power in the 
field of foreign investments since the entry 
into force of the Lisbon treaty.  Pursuant to 
Article 3(1)(e) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, the Union henceforth 
has exclusive competence a.o. in the area of 
common commercial policy, which includes a 
competence on foreign direct investment. But 
the European Members States do not all share 
the same view on every aspect as it was seen 
during the UNCITRAL Working Group 
meetings. 
(ii) Publication of documents 
The proposed Article 3 of the draft 
transparency rules deals with the documents 
that ought to be made publicly available with 
respect to an investor-State arbitration. 
Consensus was reached that the request for 
arbitration, the response to the request for 
arbitration, further written submissions by the 
disputing parties, written submissions by the 
non-disputing party to the treaty and by third 
persons, transcripts of the hearings (if 
available), orders and decisions of the arbitral 
tribunal should be made automatically 
available to the public. 
Whilst the exhibits 
are not among the 
documents that are 
subject to automatic 
disclosure, a list of 
exhibits, if it exists, 
should be made 
available to the 
public (A/CN.9/760, par. 
14-16, p. 5). Subject to 
the exceptions of 
Article 8, the arbitral tribunal will, on its own 
initiative or upon request from a disputing 
party or from a non-disputing party, and after 
consultation with the disputing parties, have 
the discretion to decide whether or not and 
how to make available to the public any other 
documents (A/CN.9/760, par. 28, p. 7). 
Witness statements and expert reports should 
also be made available, unless pursuant to 
Article 8 there is a rule that witnesses and 
experts need to be protected (A/CN.9/760, par. 
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20-21, p. 6). If transcripts of hearings contain 
confidential information, they can be redacted  
(A/CN.9/760, par. 23, p. 6). 
(iii) Publication of arbitral awards 
The proposed Article 4 did not raise any 
discussion, as there is broad support that 
arbitral awards in investor-State arbitrations 
should be made publicly available, subject to 
the exceptions of Article 8. The proposed 
Article 4 will, however, be deleted as a 
separate article and included in the proposed 
new Article 3 (A/CN.9/760, par. 38, p. 8). 
(iv) Submissions by third persons 
(“Amicus curiae”) 
Pursuant to the proposed Article 5, after 
consultation with the parties, the arbitral 
tribunal may allow a third person that is not a 
disputing party and not a non-disputing party 
to the treaty (“third person”) to file a written 
submission with the arbitral tribunal regarding 
a matter within the scope of the dispute (often 
referred to as “amicus curiae” submissions). 
Such third person wishing to make a 
submission shall apply to the arbitral tribunal 
and provide specific information: a description 
of the third person; a disclosure of any 
affiliation, direct or indirect, it may have with a 
disputing party (A/CN.9/760, par. 43, p. 9); provide 
information on any government, person or 
organization that has provided to the third 
person (i) any financial or other assistance in 
preparing the submission, or (ii) substantial 
assistance in either of the two years preceding 
the request, such as, for instance, funding 
approximately 20 per cent of its overall 
operations annually; description of the nature 
of the interest that the third person has in the 
arbitration; identification of the specific issues 
of fact or law in the arbitration that the third 
person wishes to address in its written 
submission (A/CN.9/760, par. 51, p. 11). The third 
person may make an “amicus curiae” 
submission both on matters of fact and on law  
(A/CN.9/760, par. 53, p. 11). 
The arbitral tribunal will have the power to 
impose conditions on the third person for the 
filing of the written submission. The arbitral 
tribunal shall ensure that the submission does 
not disrupt or unduly burden the arbitral 
proceedings, or unfairly prejudice any 
disputing party. It shall also ensure that the 
disputing parties are given an opportunity to 
present their observations on the submission 
by the third person  (A/CN.9/760, par. 54-57, p. 
11). 
(v) Submission by a non-disputing 
party to the treaty 
The proposed Article 6 deals with the 
possibility for a non-disputing party to the 
treaty to file submissions in the arbitration. No 
consensus could be reached yet as to whether 
the home State of the investor “may” be 
allowed or “shall” be allowed to express its 
views on issues of treaty interpretation 
(A/CN.9/760, par. 59-63, p. 12). 
As regards the right of a host State to file 
comments on further matters within the scope 
of the dispute, it will be for the arbitral tribunal 
to decide whether or not to allow a submission 
from a host State. The arbitral tribunal will 
however not be able to invite on its own 
initiative the non-disputing party to a treaty to 
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make further submissions on matters within 
the scope of the dispute since such initiative 
could risk a politicization of disputes and could 
put the non-disputing party to a treaty in a 
more privileged position than any third party 
to the dispute (A/CN.9/760, par. 69-70, p. 13). 
The arbitral tribunal shall not draw any 
inference from the absence of any submission 
or response to any invitation. The arbitral 
tribunal shall ensure that any submission does 
not disrupt or unduly burden the arbitral 
proceedings, or unfairly prejudice any 
disputing party. It shall also ensure that the 
disputing parties are given a reasonable 
opportunity to present their observations on 
any submission by a non-disputing party to 
the treaty. 
(vi) Publicity of hearings 
Whilst there was significant support for the 
principle set out in the proposed Article 7 that 
the hearings should be public, subject to the 
exception to protect confidential or sensitive 
information or the integrity of the arbitral 
process pursuant to Article 8, it was unclear 
whether consensus was reached on this 
matter. A number of delegations requested to 
reserve the right for the parties to the 
arbitration to agree on not having open 
hearings. This issue was left open for further 
deliberation (A/CN.9/760, par. 82, p. 15). 
In the meantime, it was agreed that the 
arbitral tribunal may make logistical 
arrangements to facilitate the public access to 
hearings, including where appropriate by 
organizing attendance through video links or 
such other means as it deems appropriate, 
and that it may, after consultation with the 
disputing parties, decide to hold all or part of 
the hearings in private where this is or 
becomes necessary for logistical reasons 
(A/CN.9/760, par. 88, p. 15). 
(vii) Exceptions to transparency 
The exceptions to transparency are to be set 
out in the proposed Article 8 of the rules. 
Consensus was reached on the principle that 
confidential or protected information shall not 
be made available to the public or to non-
disputing parties. No consensus could be 
reached yet as to the laws under which should 
be determined whether information is 
confidential or protected. However, there was 
unanimous support for the proposition that it 
was not permissible for a State to adopt 
UNCITRAL rules on transparency and then use 
its domestic law to undermine the spirit (or the 
letter) of such rules (A/CN.9/760, par. 103, p. 18). 
The arbitral tribunal, in consultation with the 
parties, shall make arrangements to prevent 
any confidential or protected information from 
being made available to the public, including 
by putting in place, as appropriate, (i) time 
limits in which a party, non-disputing party, or 
third person shall give notice that it seeks 
protection for such information in a document, 
(ii) procedures for the prompt designation and 
redaction of the particular confidential or 
protected information in such documents, and 
(iii) procedures for holding hearings in private 
to the extent required by Article 7 (A/CN.9/760, 
par. 110-112, p. 19). 
Where the arbitral tribunal determines that 
information should not be redacted from a 
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document, or that a document should not be 
prevented from being made available to the 
public, any disputing party, non-disputing 
party or third person that voluntarily 
introduced the document into the record shall 
be permitted to withdraw all or part of the 
document from the record of the arbitral 
proceedings (A/CN.9/760, par. 114, p. 20). 
It was also agreed that information shall not 
be made available to the public pursuant to 
Articles 2 to 7 of the rules on transparency 
where the information, if made available to the 
public, would jeopardise the integrity of the 
arbitral process, (a) because it could hamper 
the collection or production of evidence, or (b) 
because it could lead to the intimidation of 
witnesses, lawyers acting for disputing parties, 
or members of the arbitral tribunal, or (c) in 
comparably exceptional circumstances 
(A/CN.9/760, par. 118-119, p. 20-21). 
 
(viii) Repository of published 
information  (“Registry”) 
Whilst there is general support to have a 
repository of published information (“registry”) 
regarding treaty-based investor-State 
arbitrations, the delegations could not yet find 
a consensus as to whether there should be a 
single registry or several registries and, as the 
case may be, which institution(s) would be 
designated to act as registry. It was 
nonetheless agreed that if there would be 
consensus to have a single registry, then 
UNCITRAL would be the preferred repository 
institution, if it had the capacity to so act. It 
was also agreed that if the consensus would 
consist in having multiple institutions as 
repositories, then a central website should be 
established, preferably by UNCITRAL, to serve 
as a hub of information linking to such 
institutions‟ repository function. 
The UNCITRAL Secretariat will liaise with 
arbitral institutions to assess the costs and 
other implications of acting as a repository and 
will report back to the Working Group at its 
next session (A/CN.9/760, par. 120-122, p. 21). 
(ix) Costs 
The Working Group considered, for the first 
time, the issue of costs of transparency 
procedures and how they should be borne. 
After discussion, it was agreed that third 
parties requesting access to documents would 
only be required to meet the administrative 
costs of such access (such as photocopying, 
shipping, etc.). The Secretariat of UNCITRAL 
was given a mandate to draft language 
reflecting that agreement for consideration by 
the Working Group at its next session 
(A/CN.9/760, par. 130, p. 22). 
(x) Instrument for implementing the 
rules on transparency 
Finally, the question was discussed again 
whether the rules on transparency should be 
implemented in the context of both existing 
and future treaties and whether an 
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international convention should be prepared 
with a view to promoting the application of a 
legal standard on transparency to investment 
treaties. 
No consensus could be reached as to whether 
the rules on transparency will be made 
applicable on an “opt-in” basis, i.e. if States to 
an investment treaty express their consent 
thereto, or whether the rules on transparency 
shall apply on an “opt out” basis to any 
arbitration initiated under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules pursuant to an investment 
treaty, unless the treaty provides that the 
rules are not applicable. 
However, after discussion, it was agreed to 
amalgamate various proposals and to consider 
the new proposal at the next session. The 
amalgamated proposal consists of an amended 
Article 1 on the scope of application of the 
transparency rules and also of a new Article 
1(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 
2010, in order to articulate the link between 
the existing UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and 
the transparency rules. The new Article 1(4) of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules would provide 
that for treaty-based investor-State 
arbitrations, the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration 
would include the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency subject to the provison of Article 
1 of the transparency rules. The proposed new 
Article 1 of the transparency rules would 
provide that: 1.) the UNCITRAL rules on 
transparency would be applicable only to 
arbitrations under a treaty concluded after the 
coming into effect of the transparency rules, 
unless the parties have agreed otherwise (“opt 
out”); 2.) in respect of (i) investor-State 
arbitrations initiated under a treaty concluded 
before the date of coming into effect of the 
transparency rules and of (ii) investor-State 
arbitrations initiated under any other rules or 
ad hoc, the UNCITRAL transparency rules shall 
apply only if (a) the disputing parties agree to 
their application (“opt in”), or (b) the parties 
to the treaty, or in the case of a multilateral 
treaty, the home State of the investor and the 
respondent, have agreed to the application of 
the transparency rules after the date of 
coming into effect of the transparency rules 
(A/CN.9/760, par. 132-133, p. 23). 
Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Secretariat was 
given the mandate to prepare wording for (i) a 
convention on transparency in treaty-based 
investor-State arbitration, to include a draft 
clause permitting a reservation thereto, and 
(ii) for a unilateral declaration. Both these 
proposals will be considered at the next 
session of the Working Group (A/CN.9/760, par. 
141, p. 24). 
At the following Working Group session in 
February 2013 in New York the discussion will 
be continued on the matter of form and 
structure of the transparency rules and the 
third reading of the substance of the 
transparency provisions will be started. 
 
